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PROFESSOR FRASER'S BERKELEY.*

By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING.

The occasion of this paper, as its title indicates, is the appearance at the hands of Professor Fraser of what we may assume to be, if not the terminal, at least the determinative edition of the "Works and Life" of Berkeley. This is indeed an *édition de luxe*. Issuing from the Clarendon Press, these four volumes are in binding, paper, type, all that the most fastidious eye can require, whether for its pleasure or its comfort. A step nearer, and we see an excellent portrait, besides diagrams and various plates in illustration. Then all that can be done for the reader's assistance—whether by Preface or by Note, by Index or by Table of Contents—is done. Lastly, not only has every scrap of unpublished writing, known anywhere to exist, of Berkeley's, been, with whatever difficulty, recovered, but, with infinite pains and conscientiousness, every tittle of possible information bearing on any circumstance or on any person connected with the life and labors of Berkeley, has been traced, and tracked, and made to show itself. *Complete*, then, is the characterizing word that may be safely written on these superb four volumes. Complete—perhaps indeed almost *over-complete*! For it is certain that the most excellent and irreproachable

* *The Works of George Berkeley, &c., &c.* By A. C. Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1871.

of mortals do write at times what, for colorless and insipidity, is not much more than a blank and nil. (Witness, for example, the prose writings of the dear, good, super-benevolent Shelley.) And it is to be feared that the blameless Berkeley is often hardly visible for the very innocence of the bland mucilage, as it were, that seems not rarely to constitute the element of those Letters, Journals, Sermons, &c. It is quite possible, alas! that not only the "Life," but even the "Works," of Berkeley may be removed in the end—and with perfect scientific satisfaction—from a quartet of volumes to a duet of pages.

Be that as it may, the diligence, the love, the faith of Professor Fraser as an Editor are, to our belief, quite unsurpassed in philosophical literature. Had we but—to say nothing of the rest—a Hume, a Kant, and a Hegel, in such perfection of detail as a like untiringness of labor and research might extend them to us! For into this labor an earnest endeavor at explanation enters as no inconsiderable constituent; and explanation, however it be with the simple position of Berkeley, is certainly a necessity for these his fellows or, at all events, followers. Candor, too, is a very pleasing element in the explanations of Professor Fraser. If love carries him every now and then beyond the limit of reality, and into issues to which Berkeley is, at once and from the very nature of the case, strange,—candor, for its part, is not long of resuming him again into the region of fact.

The curious example of this is what concerns universals. These—thanks to the Germans!—have been seen lately to be so absolutely indispensable to philosophy that Professor Fraser cannot resist insinuating even this praise for his Berkeley also. "Universalization" of what holds of sense seems again and again to be mentioned as an original constituent of Berkeley's machinery proper, and considerable weight in the same reference is placed upon "relations." Now Berkeley, though verbally assigning to his "notions" not only mental operations but relations as well, will be found generally somewhat uneasy with these latter, as several passages in the *Commonplace Book* will assist to show; and, as for universals, up till *Siris* and some nine years previous to his death, an utter rejection of these was the precise and distinct

tive hinge on which his philosophy turned. Though we can readily understand, then, why Professor Fraser should please himself by a frequent reference to universals, this reference does seem curious in connection with Berkeley. Professor Fraser himself, indeed, ever and anon avows as much; and candor, as we say, is never slow to resume him again into the region of fact.

Denizen, in truth, of this region, Professor Fraser must, on the whole, be pronounced always; and this not more by his candor and by his faithfulness than by the reality of his intellectual gifts and intellectual acquirements. Professor Fraser has not only laboriously pieced together all that belongs whether to the philosophical thought of Hamilton or of Berkeley, but he has read widely in philosophy generally, and is at this moment as much Philosophy's votary as any man that may be named. There is in Professor Fraser, too, a certain peculiar deep-thoughtedness, clothed moreover in no unworthy style. For, whatever may be capable of being said to the contrary, it is only justice to allow Professor Fraser the praise of literary accomplishment. Despite, so to speak, an occasional phrase *Gladstonian*, Prof. Fraser is a good writer, a clear writer—even a powerful writer. In short, Prof. Fraser was precisely the ideal workman for the work in question; and this latter, consequently, has finally and definitively issued in all the perfection and completeness of which it was susceptible. Nay, there is, perhaps, a certain sadness in this triumph of an accomplished end. The last touch that finishes does not always turn out of hand *for*, but often out of hand *from*, use; and it is just possible that this perfect edition of the *works* of Berkeley appears precisely at the moment that the *work* of Berkeley ceases to function anywhere—*orbis terrarum* anywhere. The course of Berkleianism has been this. It functioned historically according to power, in its own day, upon a few; but was soon almost entirely neglected. The revival of poetry in England gradually restored in every larger heart the feeling of religion, and, where this feeling could not at the same time reconcile itself with all the elements of positive religion, Berkeleianism was felt to supply an intellectual want. Such want, though with considerable modification of form, it may be said, to some extent, still

to supply. But, side by side with it, as equal companion of the nurture, this want must now be content to accept its own opposite; for the entire matter with which Messrs. Mill and Bain seek to indoctrinate their readers at present is to be found in the earliest writings of Berkeley, and especially in his very first, the *New Theory of Vision*. All that literal acceptance of sensation and denial of any mental operation but association—all that literal acceptance of the arbitrariness of custom and denial of any necessity in human thought, that the pious Berkeley believed indispensable for the establishment of a God that directly and constantly *spoke* to us, has been bodily appropriated by the gentlemen named, and diverted by them into a very different and mostly quite opposite service. Strange! what was brought forward to buttress theology and idealism, is now the express bulwark of non-theology and materialism. This can only be so for a moment now however. Definitive philosophy, with whatever imperfection, has at length reached England, and Berkeleianism, whether rightly on either side, or wrongly on both, wanes to its disappearance. This gives a melancholy interest to Prof. Fraser's labors, and perhaps Prof. Fraser himself is not unaware of it. At all events this is certain, that, as intimated already, let love raise what superfetation it may, this superfetation is ever admitted in the end, directly or indirectly, to be one of desire merely, and candor returns, with the severity of a judge, to exact appreciation as well of the man as of the work. This, in both respects, the reader of these volumes will have no difficulty in realizing.

Professor Fraser tells us (I. vii.) that "his own love for philosophy was first engaged by Berkeley in the morning of life," and that he "regards his writings as among the best in English literature for a refined education of the heart and the intellect." We remark that, while the first phrase will be readily seen to illustrate and confirm some portions of what has been already said, the second is assuredly not saying too much for Berkeley. Apart from his peculiar philosophical principle, and in themselves, his writings are to be valued for the simple pure heart that is everywhere present in them—present in their very style indeed. Berkeley's "philosophy" rather than his literature, however, is still the

pertinent interest, and will constitute, naturally, our main consideration here. It is in its regard that Prof. Fraser says (ibidem) "Berkeley has suffered more than perhaps any other great modern philosopher from misunderstanding." Now, as to that, it would be difficult, of course, accurately to appraise the misunderstandings to which modern philosophers have been submitted, but we are disposed to admit less misunderstanding for Berkeley than almost for any other. The misunderstandings in the case of such men as Hume, as Kant and Hegel, have always been complex; whereas, in the case of Berkeley, they have been, as invariably, at least simple. Berkeleians themselves, in fact, have often *made* the misunderstanding; on which then, in the eyes of the groundlings, they have, with much delectation to themselves, done battle. In short, all misunderstanding concerning Berkeley is limited, perhaps, to the word *matter*, and one half of it has only a spurious existence in the ineptitude of men who *will* maintain, as against a sole allegation in objection, that Berkeley did *not* deny matter. These men seem to fancy that this denial of Berkeley's denial (of matter) will strike all mankind not Berkeleian with astonishment as the very reverse of what they have always been led to suppose, and that, accordingly, it will boundlessly disconcert. This is the so-called "*double-entendre*," and as a mere fiction of fence possible only to ineptitude, it is certainly quite unworthy of any substantial Berkeleian. The vulgar misunderstanding of Berkeley is to be seen, not in the allegation of a denial of matter, for Berkeley *did* deny matter, but in the imputation to his doctrine of irrelevant consequences. Berkeley denied an absolute matter, beside and independent of consciousness; but he did not deny (who could?) the sequence of material phenomena as experienced in consciousness. The question of Berkeley was of the absolute *nature* and *place* of matter *on occasion* of these ordinary material phenomena. These, then, not being denied, any such imputation of false consequences as that of Swift, "Walk through that shut door," was simply beside the point. It is quite right for all that to join issue with Berkeley, as Ueberweg does, by asserting absolute matter to exist; for Berkeley's main position undeniably is that absolute matter does

not exist. Now as Ueberweg views the question, all others—in its conditions, that is, possibly not in his conclusion—all others metaphysically inclined, since Hegel, have also viewed it. Ueberweg asserts himself able to establish by legitimate inference an actual outer independent matter, what Professor Fraser calls *abstract* matter; and herein the Berkeleians believe Ueberweg only blind to the fallacy of his own procedure. His inferences, we may suppose them to say, are only from position to position, but on each position he had never *abstract* but only *concrete* matter before him—always only matter *with* consciousness, never matter *without* consciousness. The probability is that Ueberweg's philosophy would require to be more idealistic before it could reach the position of catholic truth. Still there is no doubt but he is right so far; and despite the objection, “always *with* and never *without* consciousness,” an absolute external system of things actually does exist, and quite independent whether of any human mind or of any human body. Now, *Berkeleianism as Berkeleianism is involved in that single allegation*. On the whole, then, be the imputation of consequences what it may, the misunderstanding of Berkeley has been simple and innocent compared with the monstrous and complicated misunderstandings we have witnessed in regard to other modern philosophers. Prof. Fraser himself (vol. I. p. x) describes the outcome of “the pure philosophical works” of Berkeley only to be as follows:

“They contain his *reductio ad absurdum* of Abstract Matter, and his reasoned exposition of the merely phenomenal nature of the real material world, in opposition to skepticism, and especially to the materialistic denial that Active Intelligence is of the essence of things. The dependent, *sui generis*, existence of space and the sensible world, in which we nevertheless become aware of what is external to our own subjective personality, is with Berkeley a datum of intuitive experience; the independent or absolute existence of Matter is, on the contrary, an unintelligible hypothesis. He was the first in modern times to attack the root of what has been called Cosmothetic Idealism, and to lay the foundation, however indistinctly, of a reasoned Natural Realism—by discarding representative images in sense, and accepting instead what he believed to be the facts of consciousness. He maintains accordingly the certainty of sense perception, in oppo-

sition to ancient and to modern skeptics, who dispute the possibility of any ascertainable agreement between our perceptions and reality; and, however defectively, in opposition also to a merely subjective idealism, like Fichte's, which refers the orderly succession of sensible changes to the laws of the individual mind in which they are perceived."

And a declaration still more summary is this (p. viii):

"Is an unknowing and unknown something called Matter, or is Intelligence the supreme reality; and are men the transient results of material organization, or are they immortal beings?"

"This," says Prof. Fraser, "is Berkeley's implied question." Yes, we say, this is Berkeley's implied question, and, seeing that what concerns "intelligence," the "results of material organization," "immortal beings," &c., belongs not to the *theme* of Berkeley, but constitutes only its *corollary*, we may say that the first phrase, "Is an unknowing and unknown something, called Matter, the supreme reality?" is Berkeley's implied question. Nay, the predicates "unknowing and unknown" being but *assumed consequences* of the Berkeleian operation, it evidently is our right in the first place to leave them out, and the Berkeleian question stands, "Is a something called Matter the supreme reality?" But by this reduction it is manifest that, imputed consequences apart, there has been no misunderstanding of the theme of Berkeley even as understood by Prof. Fraser. Uninitiated human beings, when they speak of "matter," understand by it "abstract matter." This they understood Berkeley to deny; and they were right in so understanding him. They were wrong only so far as, like Swift, they fell into the fallacy of imputed consequences, and asked Berkeley to hold himself independent of the material *phenomena* that he never denied, could not deny, and never thought of denying, and make his way through shut doors, fling himself from precipices, or knock his head against lamp-posts. Even that, however, can hardly be called a misunderstanding, for it is a misunderstanding only popular; it is not a misunderstanding of Kant, of Hegel, of Ueberweg, or of any British writer who has been to school to the Germans. As said, indeed, so far as misunderstanding is concerned, the Berkeleians themselves have to blame themselves with fully one half of it in every case, and with actually the

whole of it in the case of later writers. To correct the *popular* error that drew illegitimate consequences, namely, they asserted Berkeley *not* to deny matter as ordinarily understood, but, on the contrary, to affirm matter as ordinarily understood. In this way they made confusion only worse confounded, for they reduced the dispute to a mere babble of two voices that moved parallel to each other. This is the *double-entendre*, and Berkeley himself, who originated it, must forever bear the odium of it. In this reference, however, Prof. Fraser, so far as we have seen, is perfectly blameless; he has disdained the double-entendre. If other Berkeleians imitated him in this, it would perhaps be good for themselves. Meantime, it is amusing to watch now the inept innocent craft, and now the more inept innocent conviction in which they would, to their own beliefs, thunderstrike an Ueberweg with "but Berkeley did not deny matter," or confute his (to them) necessarily fundamental, or only possible, mistake in holding to a matter which consciousness never reached. In this Berkeleian aspect there is a serenity of innocent self-belief, the underlying ineptitude of which ought to amuse and not to vex. But the good Ueberweg is now alike beyond such vexation in himself and such ineptitude in others.

In discussing this question of misunderstanding as in reference to Berkeley, which we shall now assume to be complete, the real nature of the Berkeleian thought, and as understood by Prof. Fraser, has come very fairly to the surface. There is no matter known, says Berkeley, but that that is known in and with consciousness; the matter that may be supposed to subsist side by side with consciousness and independent of consciousness, is not *known*,—it is only *inferred*, and that *falsely*. This single position together with the arguments for, and the corollaries from, it, constitutes what we may call the whole philosophy of Berkeley. Having settled abstract matter not to exist, all, to Berkeley's mind, is settled, and there is nothing more for us to do. But this a serious mistake on the part of Berkeley and all subsequent Berkeleians. All that follows from the position of Berkeley is, that the whole natural universe is now, in quality and region, mental. But, as Hegel objects, that has changed nothing; though mental in

the stuff it is now made of, and mental in the place where it is now put, the whole burthen of existence remains in its system of relations—whether these are outer or inner—after as before; and philosophy has still to begin. A philosophy that knows itself, demonstrates God to us, what he is, where he is, how the universe of things issues from him, how it returns to him—what that universe of things is in its fundamental relations of quality, quantity and measure, of finite and infinite, of substance and accident, of cause and effect—what that universe of things is in its relations of externality, no matter whether said externality be noumenal or only phenomenal in its relations of space and time, of mechanics, physics, and the organic world—what that universe of things is as on the stand-point of man; when, for explanation, many entire sciences are required, of Psychology, Law, Morals, Politics, History, Æsthetics, Religion, &c. That is the business of philosophy, and that performed, a man is *wise*; he knows the world he lives in and what he has to do in it. *But all this he may know, and, in perfectly the same manner and to the same effect, Berkeley's question as to whether externality is noumenal or phenomenal being all the time left in abeyance.* He is cheaply a philosopher, then, who is so only by virtue of knowing that externality is phenomenal! Knowing that, and indulging imagination in the few exaltations and exultations in regard to a spiritual universe that at once suggest themselves, a man may remain in an ignorance otherwise utterly crass, in an ineptitude otherwise utterly Bœotian. This, then, is a delusion that, as it has existed for some time in the world, it would be well to remove. It must become matter of universal recognition here that to know all Berkeley is scarcely to have moved from the spot, is not to have even *begun* to know philosophy. That, while to know philosophy as philosophy is the labor of years, to know philosophy as the philosophy of Berkeley, adding as well what leads from as what leads to it, is but the interest of an hour. Our understanding of a watch is not one whit advanced when we have proved that it is *in* gold, and not in copper; neither do we know one particle more of the universe when we assume it to be *in* the stuff mind than when we assume it to be *in* the stuff matter. The whole relations of

things remain the same, and the *necessity* of these relations, the *necessary intussusception* of these relations, is the business of philosophy—a matter complex, laborious, and long. What may be objected here is only what we have described as the exaltations natural to imagination in view of a universe wholly spiritual; but these exaltations are not philosophy, and in regard to God, Immortality, and Free-will, which are the only relations a spiritual universe seems to make easier for us, we are in effect just as we were. The very materialists now-a-days ply their trade with as much satisfaction in the sublimed Berkeleian matter as in the ordinary raw material. Mr. Huxley does not know, and need not know, what matter is. Mr. Darwin himself, if allowed the *relative external* conditions, will not care a brass farthing that you should prove them *absolutely within*. Noumenon-phenomenon is to him Homousia-homousia, and he will leave it quite unconcernedly to you. The transference, then, of all things from a noumenal to a phenomenal externality, leaving no substrate and no element but mind, even if it were established, would be but a very small matter; and wholly idle as regards philosophy, which would remain apart and indifferent thereby—which very certainly were never *learned* thereby. It can no longer be possible, then, to put so very much weight on Berkeley, or to assign him any capital place historically. His position, his argumentation *therefor*, his consequences *therefrom*, are all matters eminently incomplex and simple. Even if granted, they would have but a very inappreciable effect on philosophy proper, and philosophy proper neither grants them, nor requires that they should be granted! It is but misleading and mischievous to call Berkeleianism a philosophy, or a Berkeleian a philosopher—very misleading and mischievous, especially to this latter. But here we do not allude even in the most distant manner to Prof. Fraser, whose wide general acquirements and whose own profound reflections place him utterly beyond reach of any such allusions. It may be said that Berkeley was necessary to Hume, and that *through* Hume, at least, Berkeley will always have an historical position in philosophy. Even that is not so certain. Fichte and Schelling both acted on Hegel; but Hegel, for all that, makes good his historical connection directly

with Kant. So Hume. Berkeley acted on Hume doubtless; but Hume did not stand in need of this action, and has, in independence of it, made good his historical connection with Locke. Then look to the vast difference of contents in the one and in the other. While Berkeley says little more than, the inference to noumenal matter is false, there is scarcely a single one of all those great concrete interests named above as belonging to philosophy, on which the most important bearings are not to be found in Hume. In this single action of making matter mental in quality and place, it is not so certain however, that, whether it cover much or whether it cover little, whether it constitute a philosophy or whether it prove scarcely a contributory crumb, Berkeley is original. There were brave men before Agamemnon, and even idealists before the idealist special. It will be sufficient, in this reference, with barely allusion to Eleatics, Sophists, Stoics, Neoplatonists, and passing over the entire middle ages, with St. Augustin in front of them, to name Leibnitz, and to point out that, after the Cartesian doubt, such a position was involuntary. It is undeniable that Locke named what Descartes saw, the impossibility of proving the independent existence of external things, and that is almost already the position of Berkeley. In fact, that matter is only known *in* consciousness, which is at once the centre and the circumference of Berkeley, will, in the history of philosophy, not be found to have been *restricted* to Berkeley, but to have occurred to others also, although to Berkeley and to Collier only did it seem a determination of reach enough to constitute a philosophy by itself.

The quotation which we have made above will prove that our understanding of *what* constitutes the *essential* feat of Berkeley is, however much we may disagree as to the value and reach of it, identical with that of Prof. Fraser. There are other points in this quotation, however, in which we differ from Prof. Fraser, which to discuss will further tend to enable the reader to understand this phase of philosophy and in its connections with general philosophy at present. One of these points concerns cosmothetic idealism, and the allegation that Berkeley was the first in modern times to attack its "root," and "to lay the foundation, however indistinctly, of

a reasoned Natural Realism—by discarding representative images in sense, and accepting instead what he believed to be the facts of consciousness.” Now, when we consider that, in regard to “representative images,” Berkeley only said, what has been also said in another reference, “the curtain is the picture,” or, what is the same thing, the image is the object, Berkeley’s connection with the Cosmothetic Idealism will be seen to be a much simpler matter than we should be led to imagine from the words of Prof. Fraser. In fact, the entire rôle ascribed here to Berkeley is one which belongs more to Prof. Fraser’s own position and in connection with Sir W. Hamilton than directly to the position of Berkeley. So situated also is the phrase “Natural Realism” in the same passage. What Hamilton meant by Natural Realism was what we all mean, that Nature in space is a noumenal independent entity, and that we directly perceive it. What Prof. Fraser means by a “reasoned Natural Realism” is, that we perceive not a reality different from the mind in matter and in place, but identical with the mind in matter and in place. There is really then, in both respects, a certain perversion here that has only appearances, only phrases, in its support. Cosmothetic Idealism is identical with what Reid calls the “Ideal Theory.” It holds us to have direct traffic not with noumenal external things, but only with ideas. So far, then, as Berkeley acknowledges himself to know not things but ideas, he is as much a Cosmothetic Idealist as Descartes and the rest; differing from them only in this, that he withdrew the things which the ideas, for Descartes and the rest, postulated. So far also as he withdraws these things, or abolishes what Hamilton calls the objective object, he cannot be, in Hamilton’s or the ordinary sense, a Natural Realist; for to Hamilton, and the whole body of mankind to whom he appeals, the existence of an objective object is the distinctive characteristic of Natural Realism. It is only by way of a caution in the understanding of phrases that we permit ourselves these observations; for indeed, so far as philosophy is concerned, it is a matter now of no consequence whatever how Berkeley was related to Cosmothetic Idealism, or to Natural Realism either. These are names which men have ceased to conjure with.

A second point to note in the same quotation is what bears on the relation of Berkeley to the Skeptics. It sounds magniloquent that Berkeley should be so spoken of, as against the skeptics, and as in reference to "ascertainable agreement between our perceptions and reality," when we recollect that Berkeley made at once short work with *disagreement*, by cutting off one side—the side of reality.

The third and last point here concerns what is said of Fichte. Fichte's idealism is described as referring "the orderly succession of sensible changes to the laws of the individual mind in which they are perceived," and it is named—of course, with the counter-inference for the Berkeleian idealism, which is here placed "in opposition" to it—a "subjective" idealism. It is difficult to feel sure that Fichte's genetic process is here properly named; Fichte himself, at all events, meant this process to be carried on in the absolute subject; and he is praised by Hegel as having been the first, so far as genesis is concerned, to trust himself to thought alone. It is really the flexions of pure thought that constitute the instrument of Fichte's deduction, and we can hardly recognize as much in that reference to "sensible changes" and "the individual mind in which they are perceived." Fichte's is universally named a subjective idealism, but it would be infinitely more deserving of the name did the above description apply to it. But, apply or not to Fichte's, does not this description apply perfectly to Berkeley's idealism? In Berkeley's idealism, indeed, "the orderly succession of sensible changes," which just means the world and its daily march, are not referred to the "individual mind," but to God. Passing over that Fichte's idealism is not behind Berkeley's here, for Fichte only refers to the absolute individual, and that is God, but has even the advantage over it inasmuch as Berkeley's God is but an idle word—a word as idle as when to the question, What supports the world? it is answered, An elephant;—whereas what stands for God in Fichte's scheme is itself deduced and articulately determined, as well as deductively and articulately connected with all the rest. But if, from the scheme of Berkeley, God be withdrawn, all pretence for denying Berkeleianism to be a subjective idealism must fall to the ground. But how is it possible to do otherwise than with-

draw from the scheme of Berkeley the element of a God? Hegel calls Berkeley's God a *Gosse*, that is, a *spout*. Whence are the ideas—that used to be the outer world—in my consciousness? From God, says Berkeley; and does not see that to the question, What supports the world? he has only answered, The elephant. I am conscious, and I have ideas in my consciousness; but when I ask, Whence come they? and say, God, I have only used a word—I have demonstrated nothing. Even should there be an existence correspondent to the word, this existence were only the *spout* of the ideas—the spout from which they were delivered into me. Even grant the existence, it could be no more than this spout, for there is no connection, no deduction; the pieces of the machinery stand quite apart from each other in mutual isolation. But, in effect, there is only one piece known, only consciousness. The other piece is only *feigned*: we have only feigned a spout, and not demonstrated one. There are these ideas in me, but the real world to which they were ascribed no longer exists; whence, then, are they? Oh! there is a spout from which they are discharged into you, as there used to be an elephant to support the world. This, probably, will be plainer to the reader from an illustration. Here is a printed page, and there are the types that printed it. That is the relation of consciousness and the world, as ordinarily believed. Let us withdraw the types now, and we do by the page what Berkeley does by consciousness—only, the letters on the page must be supposed to drop their very ink and creep into its (the page's) substance. The page now assumes, let us say, that the letters come not from itself, and it asks, in this regard, Whence? How is it possible, if it now names a whence (nothing whatever being known *but* the letters), that this “whence” can be anything else than what Hegel figures as Berkeley's imaginary spout of supply, or what the Indians figure as the imaginary elephant of support? In point of fact, so far as connection and deduction are concerned, the Berkeleyan consciousness is limited to its own self, and the idealism of the name (Berkeleyan) must be purely subjective.

But the sufficient reason as regards refusal of the application of the epithet “objective” to the Berkeleyan idealism, lies in what is the true distinction between the idealisms indi-

cated. We could quote scores of passages in which Hegel (with anything but respect) characterizes the Berkeleian as a subjective idealism, and in this he is followed by all the later German philosophers. Now Hegel's reason is, that that idealism which resolves the system of things, substantially, into a congeries of relations of thought as thought, is necessarily objective; whereas that idealism which only transfers the universe of things from independent externality into the consciousness of the subject without further *Vermittelung*, or interconnecting process of reason, is only subjective. Anything that exists in the mere feeling or the mere conception (*Vorstellung*) of a subject is subjective. But any system of the necessary relations of thought as thought is independent of mere subjective feeling or subjective conception (*Vorstellung*), and, consequently, as being the same to all thought, objective. The cognition that appertains to the 47th proposition of Euclid is objective; but any mere feeling or conception of any matter sensuous, political, religious, æsthetic, is, as such, and though in reference to matters capable of being expressed in thoughts, subjective. This is the true distinction; and the idealism of Hegel depending on thought in its own form as thought, is objective; whereas the idealism of Berkeley that points only to the fact of sensation or perception (and that is always the element of feeling and *Vorstellung*) as its reason and its basis, is subjective. It is quite incompetent, then, to speak of Berkeleianism as opposed to subjective idealism, or to claim for it the character and name of objective idealism.

Before leaving the citation that has been so long before us, we shall just refer to the phrase "however defectively" applied by Professor Fraser in characterization of the procedure of Berkeley. What this phrase means is repeated again and again in the course of these volumes. Thus Berkeley is held (p. viii) not to have "thought out" his own doctrine "in its primary principles," not to have "sufficiently guarded" it "in some parts." Or it is alleged (p. xv) that "it is necessary to unfold what is latent, as Berkeley presupposes important principles which he does not articulately express." Or Berkeley in his *Siris* (p. xi) shall have supplemented and corrected "extreme statements to which he was impelled in

his youth," &c. What is said of the *Siris*, we may remark by-the-bye, is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, and not quite true to the mark. A note in a recent translation of Schwegler's *Umriss* of Philosophy has the merit perhaps—at least, so far as we know—of first calling attention to the peculiarities of the *Siris*. But the expectations with which certain Berkeleians have rushed to the *Siris* on this intimation—the claims they would seek to maintain of anticipations on Berkeley's part of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and who not, are simply amusing. Even Professor Fraser has yielded too readily to a like enthusiasm, and spoken too unwarily of the *Siris* being "probably the profoundest English philosophical book of the last century," of its affording supplement and corrections 'to early statements (as said), of its supplying us with Berkeley's philosophy "in its latest form," and of "the speculative thought of Berkeley" being "only partially conceived by those who neglect the latter part of the *Siris*." Alas! all this has but little support in fact. Berkeley's philosophical theory was complete in his publication of 1710, and the *Siris* of 1744 has hardly any bearing on it—rather, indeed, it is separated by a gulf from it, and stands confronting it, even frowning opposition. This is the nature of the *Siris* in Berkeley's own regard, and in other regards there cannot, so far as contribution to philosophy is concerned, be much claimed for it. What the *Siris* shows mostly is that Berkeley has somewhat forgotten his first love, his "Principles," and that meanwhile he has been reading the Greeks. In this latter respect, the erudition to which he has manifestly attained is very considerable; for his age and for his country, extraordinary indeed.

The *Siris* apart, then, what the above remarks amount to, is very obvious: we are to suppose that Berkeley attained only to an imperfect statement of his own doctrine. Now this, if well-founded, would be a most extraordinary result for a doctrine so simple, and for a writer so accomplished, as we know both, and as both are generally admitted to be. But is it well-founded—this general conception of Berkeley's statement? We are compelled to disagree with Professor Fraser here, and avow our conviction that few philosophical statements in the world stand less in need of supplement and

correction than that of Berkeley—as regards his Idealism, that is. Here Berkeley must be acknowledged to be perfectly perspicuous and perfectly complete. The completion for the doctrine of Berkeley that Prof. Fraser desiderates is, it is to be feared, only such modification of terms as might by their very newness restore to Berkeleianism some of its faded lustre and lost interest, or even perhaps lead the doctrine itself into new issues—such issues as engage the deep-thinking reflection of Professor Fraser himself on (p. xvii) “what this sense-conscious life through which we are now passing really means.”

And here we will stop for the present, having accomplished, it is hoped nevertheless, such preliminary view of the main elements of Berkeleianism as may at least usefully *guide* an examination in detail.

HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

The presupposition for Hegel's philosophy of right, of the state, and of history, was not, as is commonly said, his logic alone, but no less his psychology. Since Locke's philosophy, psychology had become properly a central science, to which investigation was directed with special predilection, and proceeding from which it was attempted to ground the other sciences, ethics, æsthetics, and religious doctrine. In this the Germans had accomplished no less significant results than the English and French. With Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason” the conception of consciousness advanced so far into the foreground as entirely to absorb psychology.

Kant left behind him an Anthropology which was an ingenious and elegant discourse on the principal elements of psychology; his scientifically established psychology will ever be sought in the transcendental æsthetics and logic of his Critique of Reason, especially in the chapter on the deduction of categories. Fichte had no psychology outside of the Science of Knowledge, Schelling none outside of his transcendental idealism. Herbart, again, had a psychology, because he replaced the ego as the subject, which maintains itself by notions (*Vorstellungen*), since he regarded these as psychic